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HIS year saw interesting developments, applications, and remind-
ers of the importance of trade secrets, of stock option "claw-
backs" in connection with non-competition covenants, and other
important business tort issues.
I. TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
A. "USE" OF A TRADE SECRET
Acquiring trade secrets or other confidential and proprietary informa-
tion is often relatively easy, especially during the excitement of a new
business venture. But after those trade secrets have been acquired, the
process of disengaging from the party that disclosed them-and venturing
off in the same line of business-is another matter entirely and can be
difficult.
Mabrey v. SandStream, Inc. illustrates the point.1 SandStream planned
to design the first "converged" architecture for delivering television, tele-
phone, internet, movies, and games into homes via fiber-optic networks
* Charles M. Hosch is a partner of Strasburger & Price, LLP in Dallas, Texas. He
co-teaches Trademarks and Business Torts at SMU Dedman School of Law. The views
expressed in this article are his and not necessarily those of the firm or its clients.
1. 124 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
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using an internet protocol. It had invested $40 million and four years in
development. SandStream had not yet produced a final product when
Mabrey-a developer of planned residential communities-contacted it
in January 2002. After signing a confidentiality agreement, Mabrey per-
formed technological and business due diligence investigations of Sand-
Stream and contributed modest investments and loans to it. Separately,
Irving Napert, an independent consultant for Sundance Square Develop-
ment in Fort Worth, contacted SandStream regarding the suitability of
the technology for Sundance Square. He also signed a confidentiality
agreement and was allowed to see all of SandStream's financial informa-
tion supporting its business plan. Neither Mabrey nor Napert, however,
actually contracted with SandStream for its services.
2
SandStream experienced financial difficulties and laid off most of its
staff, still without deploying its service. Two of its former employees
joined with Napert and formed Fiber.TV; Mabrey was its sole stock-
holder and financier. SandStream saw that Fiber.TV intended to com-
pete directly with SandStream and alleged that Fiber.TV's "sole purpose
[was to improperly use] SandStream's technology, unique industry rela-
tionships, business practices and financial and business models... .,3 The
trial court entered a temporary injunction enjoining the defendants from
using SandStream's trade secrets.
4
As a preliminary matter, the court of appeals noted that, in determin-
ing whether to grant a trade secret protection by temporary injunction, "a
trial court does not determine whether the information sought to be pro-
tected is, in fact and in law, a trade secret." 5 Instead, "the trial court
determines only whether the applicant has established that the informa-
tion is entitled to trade secret protection until the trial on the merits" and
a probability of success is sufficient. 6 Significantly, after the injunction
was ordered by the trial court, the appellate court reviewed it under a
"some evidence" standard. 7
Like many nondisclosure agreements, the one signed by Mabrey ex-
pressly provided that he could "negotiate or enter into transactions simi-
lar to or in lieu of the Proposed Transaction."'8 Mabrey argued that this
allowed him to form a new company to perform a similar transaction.
The court disagreed that the agreement's language could be read to per-
mit Mabrey to use SandStream's trade secrets "to decide to invest in a
company that intended to use SandStream's secret information to pro-
duce and market the identical product."9 The court held that such a pur-
pose could not be reconciled with other provisions of the nondisclosure
2. See id. at 307-08.
3. Id. at 308.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 311.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 315.




agreement, which provided he would not use SandStream's confidential
information for any other purpose, including any use that "could reasona-
bly result in a competitive disadvantage to [SandStream]." 10
"Use" of SandStream's information by Mabrey was itself an issue. Ma-
brey contended that he never "disclosed" SandStream's trade secrets to
anyone. But did he "use" them in forming Fiber.TV? In the court's view,
there was at least "some evidence" establishing a probability that Mabrey
"used" the trade secrets and confidential and proprietary information he
had previously acquired from SandStream as his basis for deciding to in-
vest in Fiber.TV.1 1
SandStream also argued that Mabrey had "aided" the other defend-
ants-particularly the former employees of SandStream-to breach their
fiduciary duty to SandStream to hold its trade secrets in confidence after
the termination of their employment. Mabrey argued there was no evi-
dence of any such aid on his part, but the court again disagreed. Mabrey
was Fiber.TV's sole stockholder and sole investor, and there was testi-
mony that his purpose in providing this funding was to give the former
engineers of SandStream "time to get more money." There was also evi-
dence that Mabrey knew the identity of these engineers and their signifi-
cant range of talent. The court, therefore, concluded there was at least
some evidence that Mabrey "aided" the other individual defendants to
breach their own fiduciary duties as former employees of SandStream.1 2
The fact that SandStream was nearly insolvent may have led Mabrey
and the others to believe it was not a viable company that would survive,
and thus would not suffer any harm (irreparable or otherwise) if they
proceeded with the Fiber.TV venture. But SandStream's precarious fi-
nancial footing provided scant equitable support for the defendants. By
the time of the hearing, SandStream still had not made any revenue, had
no employees drawing a salary, and had only three people showing up at
the office regularly. Nevertheless, the court noted that "an irreparable
injury exists when unfair competition deprives the initial producer of the
fair opportunity to market its product," and held that the fact that "an
applicant for injunctive relief from improper use of trade secrets has
ceased to do business or to use the protected information does not pre-
clude its entitlement to injunctive relief."'13
"Use" and proof of loss resulting from such "use" were also at issue in
10. Id. at 314-15.
11. Id. at 315. Compare Omnitech Int'l, Inc. v. Chlorox Co., 11 F.3d 1316, 1325 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 815 (1994) (holding that it is not a trade secret infringement to
become "smarter" about an industry).
12. SandStream, 124 S.W.3d, at 316-17.
13. Id. at 319-20. The court cited Elcor Chem. Corp v. Agri-Sul, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 204,
213 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming "judgment enjoining use of
trade secrets even though there was evidence that Elcor was in serious financial difficulty,
had ceased to produce product, had let employees go, had sold some of its facilities, and




Propulsion Technologies, Inc. v. Attwood Corp.14 Attwood produced
rough castings of boat propellers for Propulsion Technologies. The jury
found that Atwood had fraudulently induced Propulsion Technologies to
enter into the contract, breached it, and then misappropriated Propulsion
Technologies' trade secrets.
The appellate court reversed the district court's award of damages for
misappropriation of trade secrets, citing Avera v. Clark Moulding for the
proposition that "one element of proof of misappropriation of trade
secrets is 'proof ... that the defendant used the trade secret without au-
thorization from the plaintiff."' 15 The only proof of such use the court
found in the record was Propulsion Technologies' argument that a rea-
sonable inference of Attwood's use arose from one witness's testimony
that producing Propulsion Technologies' propellers "kind of gave
[Attwood] the ability to learn how to make them."' 16 In the court's view,
however, this did not describe use of a trade secret, and contrary testi-
mony about design differences in Attwood's propellers and the fact that
other propeller makers used different tool designs "foreclose[d] an infer-
ence of misuse of trade secrets .... "17 Because there was no evidence
that Atwood used the plaintiff's trade secrets to generate profits from its
own line of propellers, there was no evidence of damages (described by
the court as "[Propulsion Technologies'] loss or anyone else's gain"), and
the judgment was reversed. 18
B. DISCOVERY OF TRADE SECRETS
Discovery of trade secrets gave rise to considerable controversy over
the last few years. 19 In late 2003, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the
issue again, this time clarifying what it means to have documents contain-
ing trade secrets in one's "possession, custody or control" as provided in
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.3(b) and 193.7(b). 20 The trial court, in
a post-divorce action filed against Mr. Kuntz, had ordered Mr. Kuntz to
produce documents to which he had access at his place of employment.
The documents were actually in the physical possession of Kuntz's em-
ployer, were owned by a client of Kuntz's employer, and constituted that
client's trade secrets. Kuntz had access to the documents, but he urged
that his access did not constitute "possession, custody or control" because
requiring him to produce these documents would force him to violate his
own confidentiality obligations, potentially subjecting himself to signifi-
cant liability. 21 The court agreed, perhaps moved by the colorful analogy
14. 369 F.3d 896 (5th Cir. 2004).
15. Id. at 905 n.57 (emphasis added) (citing Avera v. Clark Moulding, 791 S.W.2d 144,
145 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ)).
16. Id. at 905.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See generally In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 730 (Tex. 2003); In re
Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. 2003).
20. See In re Kuntz, 124 S.W.3d 179, 180-89 (Tex. 2003).
21. Id. at 180.
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offered by the employer as amicus.22 Regarding the trade secrets, Mr.
Kuntz was "like a bank teller with access to cash in the vault," but he had
"neither possession, nor any right to possess" the trade secrets
themselves.2 3
Interestingly, four justices concurred, with the additional view that Mr.
Kuntz's former wife was not entitled to production of the documents be-
cause she had not established that production of those privileged trade
secrets would be "essential to the fair adjudication of her claims."'24 Jus-
tice Wainwright concurred in a separate opinion, further describing the
facts and explaining that Mr. Kuntz's former wife wanted to see the docu-
ments in order to verify the compensation-related information she was
otherwise receiving.2 5
C. HARM AND SCOPE OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Harm and the scope of a temporary injunction were the principal issues
in Fox v. Tropical Warehouses, Inc. 26 Tropical Warehouses, a freshwater
tropical fish wholesaler, had been selling fish to Wal-Mart stores since
1978 and to Petco for the last six or seven years. With only anecdotal
exceptions, Wal-Mart and Petco were Tropical Warehouses' only custom-
ers. Fox was Tropical Warehouses' general manager for about ten years.
Fox had complete access to all the company's financial information, but
he focused almost entirely on sales to Petco, while the owner focused on
Wal-Mart. 27
On one occasion, Petco demanded a considerable price discount. The
owner did not agree to it. Fox gave two weeks notice and left, taking with
him a rolodex and personally-owned computer he used at work, which
contained much of Tropical Warehouses' financial information. Fox then
opened his own business and began selling fish to Petco at the discounted
price that Petco had demanded, but which Tropical Warehouses' owner
refused to give. Tropical Warehouses sued, and the trial court granted a
temporary injunction. 28
The appellate court readily concluded that Fox had access to Tropical
Warehouses' confidential and proprietary information and that its price
lists, customer lists, and the information contained in the reports would
be entitled to trade secret protection until trial.29 However, when Fox
raised the "use" defense, arguing that he was not actually using it to gain
a competitive advantage over Tropical Warehouses, the court responded
that "[Tropical Warehouses] is not required to prove that Fox is actually
using the information; it need only prove that he is in possession of the
22. Id.
23. Id. at 183-84.
24. Id. at 184-85.
25. Id. at 186-87.
26. 121 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 856-57.
29. Id. at 858-59.
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information and is in a position to use it. ' 30
To support its claim for a temporary injunction, Tropical Warehouses
was also required to show that it faced a probable, imminent, and irrepa-
rable injury from Fox's use of these trade secrets. With respect to Wal-
Mart, the court concluded that probable injury to Tropical Warehouses
was shown. With Petco gone, Wal-Mart comprised almost all of Tropical
Warehouses' current business, and if Fox were allowed to use his knowl-
edge of Tropical Warehouses' pricing to cause the loss of Wal-Mart as a
customer, the damages would indeed be difficult to calculate. 31 But Fox
did hit the mark in arguing, in the alternative, that he should not be en-
joined from at least continuing to sell to Petco. For years Tropical Ware-
houses had been selling fish to Petco cheaper than it sold to Wal-Mart.
Lower prices to Petco did not seem likely to drive Wal-Mart away be-
cause Tropical Warehouses' owner still refused to give Petco the discount
it demanded. In any event, Petco based the price it would pay on the
price charged by a different supplier and would not do business with any-
one who would not at least match that supplier's price. In short, the pos-
sibility that Tropical Warehouses' business with Wal-Mart would be
crippled by Fox continuing to sell to Petco on his own seemed, to the
court, remote and speculative. Noting that an injunction "is not proper
when the claimed injury is merely speculative" and that "fear and appre-
hension of injury are not sufficient to support a temporary injunction,"
the court modified the temporary injunction to permit Fox to continue to
sell to Petco. 32
The scope of the injunction in Mabrey v. SandStream, Inc. was also
controversial. Mabrey argued that the injunction was overbroad and
vague because it was not limited to secret "information disclosed by
SandStream 'prior to completion of the Proposed Transaction"' as the
confidentiality agreement provided. 33 The court disagreed, holding that
the order specifically referred only to "'SandStream's confidential and
proprietary information ... or trade secret information,' which necessa-
rily excludes information not generally available to the public, and the
order [was] limited in time to information obtained while Mabrey was a
party to the nondisclosure agreement."' 34 The court noted that the "order
specifically lists the acts prohibited by the defendants," including "mak-
ing any commercial, business or personal use of SandStream Confidential
Information. ... ,,35 Whether this was specific enough to provide Mabrey
with a clear guideline of what he was and was not permitted to do may be
arguable, since whether Mabrey had made any "use" of the information
30. Id. at 860 (emphasis added) (citing Rugen v. Interactive Bus. Sys., Inc., 864 S.W.2d
548, 552 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ) and T-N-T MotorSports, Inc. v. Hennessey, 965
S.W.2d 18, 24 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. dism'd)).
31. See id.
32. Id. at 860-61 (citing Jordan v. Landry's Seafood Rest., Inc., 89 S.W.3d 737, 742
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied)).
33. SandStream, Inc., 124 S.W.3d at 320.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 320 n.49.
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in the first place was itself one of the very points at issue in the case.36
D. WHAT CONSTITUTES A "TRADE SECRET"
What constitutes a "trade secret" was also a matter of concern in Gen-
eral Universal Systems, Inc. v. Hal, Inc.,37 where the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed a summary judgment order that a certain software pro-
gram was not properly protected as a trade secret. The appellant argued,
and the court of appeals agreed, that the district court "applied an outmo-
ded and overly restricted test for trade secret misappropriation.1 38
The district court concluded that Texas law requires the claimed trade
secret to have been discovered by improper means. 39 However, the court
noted that liability might also be imposed if the defendant's "disclosure
or use [of the trade secret] constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in
him by the other in disclosing the secret to him"-the record was unclear
as to whether there was such a confidential relationship. 40
Separately, the district court concluded "that Texas law requires that a
person asserting a trade secret take reasonable precautions to protect
it. ' ' 41 Because the district court found that the claimant in this case did
not take such reasonable precautions, it concluded the software was not
properly protected as a trade secret.42 The court of appeals required a
broader approach and followed the Texas Supreme Court's recent clarifi-
cation that, to determine whether a trade secret exists, a court must ex-
amine six relevant but nonexclusive criteria. The appellate court affirmed
this process as "a contextual inquiry which must evaluate a number of
factors. ' 43 Since the district court did not engage in this broad inquiry,
and the court of appeals concluded that further factual development
might shed light on whether trade secret protection was appropriate, it
reversed the grant of summary judgment on that issue.44
36. Id. at 320-21.
37. 379 F.3d 131, 149 (5th Cir. 2004).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 151.
40. Id. at 151 (citing Elcor Chem. Corp. v. Agri-Sul, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 204, 211 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In a footnote, the court noted the lack of a
formal confidentiality agreement. One party urged that was evidence of a lack of a duty of
confidentiality among the parties, which the court noted "finds some support in Texas
law," but the court added that at least one Texas court had expressly rejected that argu-
ment. Id. at 151 n.55 (comparing Daily Int'l Sales Corp. v. Eastman Whipstock, Inc., 662
S.W.2d 60, 63 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ) with T-N-T Motorsports, Inc.
v. Hennessey Motor Sports, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 18, 22 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998,
pet. dism'd).
41. Id. at 150.
42. Id.
43. See id. (citing In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 739-40 (Tex. 2003)).
44. Id. at 150.
These six factors are: (1) the extent to which the information is known
outside of the business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and
others inside involved in the business; (3) the extent of measures taken to
safeguard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to
him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended in
2005]
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E. "BOUNDARIES" OF A TRADE SECRET
A common, vexing question often arises as to the "boundaries" of a
trade secret. This question arises in a context where general scientific
principles are well known, yet product formulations are less known but
still generally familiar in an industry and specific recipes or formulations
may be the subject of considerable experimentation, trial, or error. An
application of trade secret principles in this context was found in Nations
AG II, LLC v. Hide Co., LLC.45 The Hide Company was a sales repre-
sentative for Nations AG, which along with other plaintiffs formulated
and sold generic versions of pesticides from expired patents. The plain-
tiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Hide from using or dis-
closing their formula for mepiquat chloride, a product useful in the cotton
industry.46
After describing the In re Bass4 7 six-factor test to determine whether a
trade secret exists, the court concluded that a trade secret did not exist, or
at least the plaintiffs had not met their burden of showing a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits in that respect.48 The defendants had
shown that the formula for mepiquat chloride can be determined from
reading product labels, which is well known in the agricultural field. The
plaintiff's formula was based on an expired patent that anyone could copy
in a generic formulation. But at a more precise level, the record showed
that "batch sheets" would reflect the formulation of a particular batch of
mepiquat chloride, and formulation could vary depending on the purity
of the technical ingredient. In the court's view, the plaintiffs did not set
forth sufficient evidence to support the claim that the mepiquat chloride
batch sheet that the defendants allegedly obtained was a trade secret.
49
II. BUSINESS DISPARAGEMENT AND LIBEL
Dripping Wet Water, Inc. v. Halox Technologies, Inc.50 presented famil-
iar claims of business disparagement, libel and slander, but in an unusual
procedural posture. 51 Plaintiffs complained that a defendant "composed,
developing the information; and (6) the ease or difficulty with which the in-
formation could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
Id.
45. No. 3:04-CV-0511-K, 2004 WL 1496312 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 2004).
46. Id. at *1.
47. 113 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003).
48. Nations AG II, LLC, WL 1493612, at *4.
49. Id. at *6.
50. No. SA-03-CA-1048-0G, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18532 (W.D. Tex. March 22,
2004).
51. The tort of business disparagement is distinct from the tort of personal defamation
by libel or slander, though they are often, and incorrectly, described interchangeably. De-
rogatory comments which disparage the quality of a product or service, thereby injuring
the reputation of a business and causing economic injury, are addressed as "business dis-
paragement." Defamatory statements which defame the reputation of a person, and cause
a personal injury, are addressed as libel (if written) or slander (if spoken). The general
elements of business disparagement are "publication by the defendant of the disparaging
words, falsity, malice, lack of privilege, and special damages." Prudential Ins. Co. v. Fin.
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published and circulated" a written report or circular claiming the follow-
ing: the plaintiffs' product would cause corrosion and environmental vio-
lations; the product lacked safety features; it was made at night by
workers receiving no benefits; and it was more expensive. 52 The plaintiffs
also claimed that the defendants stated that the plaintiffs "stole" the tech-
nology they were using and were going to lose their patent.
53
The defendants removed the case to federal court in San Antonio and
alleged that the plaintiff had fraudulently joined non-diverse DXP, a
Texas corporation, to defeat diversity jurisdiction. Apparently, the plain-
tiffs did not claim DXP was the original source of the derogatory state-
ments, but instead alleged that it had "ratified, approved and condoned
the acts of [the source of the comments] both expressly and impliedly, by
its inaction."' 54 To show that DXP had been fraudulently joined, the de-
fendants needed to "put forth evidence that [would] negate the possibility
of liability," a heavy burden indeed since it would amount to negating
that there is a "reasonable basis for predicting that state law might im-
pose liability."' 55 To make this showing, the defendants offered extensive
affidavits and other evidence, not to challenge whether the specific state-
ments were made, but to negate DXP's role in their creation or publica-
tion. DXP was able to show that it was not an agent of the other
defendants, that it had had no role in composing or offering advice about
the PowerPoint presentation at issue, and that it "did not ratify, condone,
approve, support, confirm, or adopt" the presentation.5 6 The plaintiffs
made no challenge to DXP's factual assertions that it was "merely pre-
sent" at the meeting where the presentation was shown, and accordingly,
the court could not conclude that there was "arguably a reasonable basis
to predict that DXP would be liable" for defamation or business
disparagement. 57
Demand letters may also be a source of claims and, therefore, they can
require careful drafting. In Cram Roofing Co., Inc. v. Parker, the general
manager of the Rio Grande Valley branch office of a roofing company
either abruptly quit or was fired (this was disputed) and joined with the
company's former production manager to start a new, competing roofing
company. 58 Cram Roofing's attorney then wrote a dozen identical letters
to various suppliers and roofing companies that Cram Roofing believed
would be the new company's prospective customers. The letters ex-
Review Servs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 82 (Tex. 2000). See also Hurlbut v. Gulf At. Life Ins.
Co., 749 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. 1987).
52. Dripping Wet Water, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18532, at *38-39.
53. Id.
54. Id. at *39. The court noted that "the mere fact the people appear together with
the person making defamatory statements is no evidence that they agree with the de-
famer .... [but] a person's presence when viewed in context with actions, inactions, or
words indicating approval may be sufficient for a jury to impose liability for defamation."
Id. at *32, *35 n.110 (citing Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. 2002)).
55. Id. at *26.
56. Id. at *52.
57. Id. at *53.
58. 131 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.).
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plained that Cram Roofing would be pursing a legal action against the
former employees and potentially against any new customers as well, "to
recover all profits obtained by [the prospective customers] as a result of
[the former employees'] illegal activities. '59 Soon afterwards, the former
branch office general manager sued Cram Roofing for libel on the basis
of the statements in the demand letter that he had "voluntarily termi-
nated" his employment and the accusation that he had engaged in "illegal
activities. '60 At trial, he obtained a jury verdict on the libel claim. 61
On appeal, Cram Roofing argued that merely commenting that some-
one "quit" or "voluntarily terminated" his employment, was not defama-
tory; a statement is only "defamatory if it tends to injure a living person's
reputation and thereby expose the person to public hatred, contempt or
ridicule, or financial injury or to impeach any person's honesty, integrity,
virtue, or reputation. ' 62 The appellate court agreed, and held that the
statement that he had quit his employment, when construed in light of the
rest of the demand letter and the surrounding circumstances, did not con-
stitute defamation.63
Whether the statement that he had engaged in "illegal activities" was
libelous was another issue. Cram Roofing argued that this was substan-
tially true as a matter of law and hence not libelous because "truth is a
defense to a libel action." 64 "Because substantial truth is sufficient to
establish the defense" under the "substantial truth" test, the "statement
under question is examined in its entirety to determine whether the 'gist'
of the statement is substantially true."'65
Cram Roofing argued that it was substantially true that the former em-
ployees had engaged in "illegal activities"-they had breached a contract
(the noncompetition agreement) that carried the force of law, and their
breach was "illegal."'66 One dissenting justice relied on the dictionary
definition of "illegal" that included anything that is "contrary to or violat-
ing a law or rule or regulation or something else (as an established cus-
tomer) having the force of law."'67 Since it was clear that Mr. Parker
violated the noncompetition agreement, the dissent found that he thereby
engaged in "illegal activities," that the "gist" of the statement must be
substantially true, and Cram Roofing was not liable. 68
The majority, however, held that "[w]hile a contract may indeed have
the force of law, breach of a contract is not necessarily an illegal activity"
but rather "a civil breach of an obligation imposed by the contract. '69
59. Id. at 88.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (quoting TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 1997)).
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.005 (Vernon 1997).
65. Id. (citing Mcllvain v. Jacobs, 794 S.W.2d 14, 15-16 (Tex. 1990)).
66. Id. at 91.
67. Id. at 93.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 91.
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The court charged the jury that "[i]t is sufficient to establish libel if in
reading the statement an ordinary person would draw a reasonable con-
clusion that [the individual] was charged with violation of some criminal
law."' 70 The court concluded that on this record, the jury could reasona-
bly have found that the gist of the phrase "illegal activities" meant crimi-
nal activities.7 1 Because witnesses had testified that the phrase "illegal
activities" conjures up thoughts of criminal violations, the majority con-
cluded that the jury could have properly determined that the individual
had been libeled, and the gist of the statement about "illegal activities"
was not substantially true.72
III. LANHAM ACT SECTION 43(A) AND FALSE
DESIGNATIONS OF ORIGIN
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the United States Supreme
Court's reasoning from a 2003 ruling in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp.73 when faced with a similar issue in General Universal
Systems, Inc. vs. Hal, Inc.74 Plaintiff General Universal Systems ("GUS")
accused Hal of copyright infringement and a number of other business
torts involving Hal's software, which GUS found unacceptably close to its
own. GUS argued to the district court that Hal, by copying and market-
ing GUS's software as Hal's own, engaged in "reverse palming off" in
violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). The
District Court declined to find that Hal engaged in actionable copying,
and so the court refused to find that Hal's software constituted "reverse
palming off."75
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal, partly be-
cause it also rejected the copyright argument, but also due to the Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Dastar Corp.76 The court concluded
70. Id. at 92.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 91-92. A retired contractor testified that if he received such a letter, the
reference to "illegal activities" would make him nervous and make him "want to stay away
from that individual." When asked what the term "illegal activities" meant to him, he
responded "Well, nowadays time, I think he would either be a dope peddler or a gun
runner." Id. at 91.
73. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
74. 379 F.3d 131 (5th Cir. 2004).
75. Id. at 148. "Reverse palming off" occurs when "[t]he producer misrepresents
someone else's goods or services as his own." Id. at 148 n.41 (quoting Dastar Corp., 539
U.S. at 28 n.1). "A defendant may also be guilty of reverse palming off by selling or offer-
ing to sell another's product that has been modified slightly and then labeled with a differ-
ent name." Id. (quoting Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 1990)).
76. Id. at 149. In Dastar Corp., Dastar purchased copies of an original 1949 television
series with a copyright that once was owned by Twentieth Century Fox, but was expired
and now in the public domain. Dastar edited the series and released it; Fox brought suit,
alleging that Dastar's sale of its own version of the series without proper attribution to the
1949 series constituted "reverse palming off" in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act. The Court concluded that "the term 'origin' in section 43(a) applies only to the pro-
ducer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea,
concept, or communication embodied in those goods." Id. at 148-49 (quoting Dastar
Corp., 539 U.S. at 37).
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that Dastar's reasoning was controlling because GUS did not accuse Hal
of removing the trademarks from GUS's software and selling that
software as Hal's own. Instead, GUS asserted that Hal "copied the ideas,
concepts, structures and sequences embodied in its copyrighted work,
thereby concluding that Dastar makes clear that such claims are not ac-
tionable under section 43(a)."'77
The Dastar case applied in Keane v. Fox Television Stations as well. 78
Keane alleged that Fox Television's use of the phrase "American Idol" to
identify its television series constituted a false designation of origin under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 79 The court found
Keane's claims "derailed by two fundamental, fallacious premises. '80
The first was Keane's supposition that his "American Idol" concept or
idea could be protected by trademark law. 81 Relying on Dastar Corp.
and other precedent, the court noted that "trademarks are devices in-
tended to identify fully developed products and services, not ideas for
products or services."' 82 The court also noted that the Supreme Court
clarified the phrase "origin of goods" in section 43(a), confirming that "it
does not connote the person or entity that originated the ideas or com-
munications" embodied in the resulting commercial product, but rather
"the name-recognition that a preexisting producer has created in the mar-
ketplace.83 Federal trademark law "is not concerned with 'invention or
discovery' of ideas, and the [Supreme] Court explicitly cautions against
extending trademark law in that manner. '84
The plaintiff's second fallacy was that being the first to use the "Ameri-
can Idol" mark was itself sufficient to give him exclusive rights to that
mark.85 "Mere invention, creation or discussion of a trademark does not
77. Id. at 149. The court noted that "ideas" are expressly excluded from protection
under the Copyright Act of 1976. Id. at 142-43. See also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2005).
78. 297 F. Supp. 2d 921 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
79. Id. at 934. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides: (1) any person who, on or in
connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading misrepresentation of
fact, which (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the ori-
gin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by an-
other person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, ser-
vices, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes
that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. 15 U.S.C. §1125(a)(1)(A)-(B)
(2005). Actions brought subsection 1125(a)(1)(A) are sometimes referred to as "false des-
ignation of origin" claims, while actions brought under subsection 1125(a)(1)(B) are some-
times referred to as "false advertising claims." Keane, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 934.
80. Id. at 933.
81. Id.
82. Id. (emphasis added). The court might have clarified its point to make clear that
trademarks are not so much intended to identify the products or services themselves, as
they are intended to identify the sources of those products or services.
83. Id. at 935.
84. Id. (citing Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33-34).
85. Id. at 934.
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create priority rights."'86 The court then examined Keane's allegations
and concluded that, even in the context of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, Keane had
neither alleged nor could show that members of the general public had
come to know and associate the "American Idol" mark with him before
the Fox television series aired. 87 Keane admitted that he never actually
sold or produced his show, and the only "use" he alleged was an admit-
tedly unsuccessful effort to sell it. In the court's view, "mere expectation
or hope that a mark will be used, i.e., attempts at 'promotion and market-
ing' of an idea under a 'mark,' is insufficient to establish exclusive rights
in a mark."'88
IV. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
In Burke v. Union Pacific Resources Co.,89 the Texarkana Court of Ap-
peals again expressed dissatisfaction with the Texas Supreme Court's con-
clusion that the proper limitations period on a cause of action for tortious
interference is two years. 90 In Dickson Construction, Inc. v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co. of Maryland,91 the Texarkana court first criticized the Texas
Supreme Court's reasoning that led to that conclusion, though it chose to
adhere to the application of section 16.003 to tortious interference claims
"until the Texas Supreme Court changes its interpretation. '92
In Burke, the plaintiff was a feedlot operator who complained that seis-
mic operations by the defendant caused its water well to produce too
much sand, effectively ruining the feedlot business. The initial question
was whether the "discovery rule" applied to claims for tortious interfer-
ence. 93 The defendant argued that it did not because tortious interfer-
ence dealing with these types of injuries is "not inherently undiscoverable
and objectively verifiable." The Texarkana court assumed, but did not
specifically decide, that the discovery rule applied. The court concluded
that even if the discovery rule applied, there was evidence from which a
rational juror could have concluded that the plaintiffs knew or should
have known that a third party committed tortious acts before the filing
deadline expired. The court also concluded that the great weight and pre-
ponderance of the evidence was not contrary to the jury's conclusion as
86. Id. (quoting Hydro-Dynamics, Inc. v. George Putnam & Co., Inc., 811 F.2d 1470,
1473 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
87. Id. at 936-37.
88. Id. at 937. The court cited Lucent Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 186 F.3d
311, 318 (3d Cir. 1999) and Zazu Designs v. L'Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992),
both relying on Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1975), "for the
proposition that meaningful and public commercial use is required to establish rights in an
unregistered mark." Id.
89. 138 S.W.3d 46 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. filed).
90. Id. at 71. See also First Nat'l Bank of Eagle Pass v. Levine, 721 S.W.2d 287, 289
(Tex. 1986) (holding that tortious interference with business relations was within the mean-
ing of trespass in TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 1986)).
91. 960 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, pet. denied).
92. Burke, 138 S.W.3d at 71.
93. Id. at 60-61.
2005]
SMU LAW REVIEW
to indicate that the result was clearly wrong.94 The court relied on the
Texas Supreme Court's holding that two years is the proper limitations
period for tortious interference claims; the claim was held to be barred. 95
V. COMMON LAW MISAPPROPRIATION
Common law misappropriation is a hybrid cause of action that is often
confusing and difficult to define or apply. In Texas, a commonly cited
case for misappropriation analysis is U.S. Sporting Products, Inc. v.
Johnny Stewart Game Calls, Inc.,96 which defines the elements of the
cause of action as (1) the creation by plaintiff of a "product through ex-
tensive time, labor, skill and money;" (2) the use of that product by de-
fendant in competition with plaintiff, thereby giving the defendant a
special competitive advantage because he was "burdened with little or
none of the expense incurred by plaintiff" in the creation of the product;
and (3) commercial damage to plaintiff.97 Under a broad reading, this
definition arguably could extend to virtually any copying of unpatented
ideas or concepts in the public domain and run afoul of the Sears/
Compco Doctrine. 98 Even when employing a narrower reading, a troub-
ling preliminary issue is determining exactly what is being
misappropriated.
In Thomason v. Collins & Aikman Floor Coverings, Inc.,99 the San
Antonio Court of Appeals addressed this question. Thomason was an
independent carpet manufacturer's representative with an agreement
with Collins & Aikman ("C&A") as to the volume prices it would charge
for carpets sold to the state of Texas under a particular contract. 100 When
C&A later raised its volume price and, according to Thomason, earned an
additional $1.8 million of profits for which it did not pay Thomason addi-
tional commissions, Thomason "sued C&A alleging breach of contract,
breach of agency relationship, breach of fiduciary and/or duty of good
faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and
misappropriation." 10 1
Thomason alleged that C&A misappropriated the "fruits of [his]
knowledge, work and efforts. '10 2 The court did not doubt that Thoma-
son's time, labor, and skill were spent securing C&A's position on the
1996 contract. 10 3 Nevertheless, the court sought an actual "work prod-
uct" that was misappropriated. According to the court, "an element of a
94. Id.
95. Id. at 72.
96. 865 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied).
97. Id. at 218.
98. See Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964); Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-39 (1964).
99. No. 04-02-00870-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 2823 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, Mar.
31, 2004, pet. denied).
100. Id. at *1-3.
101. Id. at *4-5.
102. ld. at *13.
103. Id. at *13-14.
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claim for misappropriation is the creation of a work product, ' 10 4 and
Thomason's time, labor and skill "did not result in a 'work product' sub-
ject to appropriation by a competitor. 10 5
Though not addressed in Thomason, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
recently discussed common law misappropriation in Dresser-Rand Co. v.
Virtual Automation, Inc.10 6 In that case, Dresser-Rand hired a Mr. Mez-
zatesta to develop a new type of control system through the "Trax" pro-
ject that could both operate machinery and control a plant. Mr.
Mezzatesta, while employed by Dresser-Rand, formed a separate com-
pany, Virtual Automation, to market a controls product that could simul-
taneously operate machinery and process controls. Virtual Automation
signed a contract with Apix, a hardware manufacturer, on the same day
that Apix signed an exclusive sales agreement with Dresser-Rand. At
trial, the jury found for Dresser-Rand on its common law misappropria-
tion claim against Apix. 10 7
On appeal, Apix claimed that, because the "Trax" project was never
completed, there was no final product to misappropriate. The court ob-
served that "Texas misappropriation law is specially designed to protect
the labor-the so-called 'sweat equity'-that goes into creating the
work," and the court did not accept the argument that there could be no
misappropriation because there was no "final" product. 10 8 The court
heard testimony that Dresser-Rand produced the plan and specifications
to make the product and that this was "the essence of the product." The
court concluded that "a final product is not required before it can be
misappropriated" and upheld the lower court's judgment. 10 9
Apix also argued that it had never made a product using the features
that Dresser-Rand planned to use. But the court viewed the testimony as
establishing that there were only superficial differences between their
products that were intended to be made, and thereby concluded there
was sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that Apix "used"
technology features associated with the Trax product.1 10 Apix also
claimed that it had never sold its own product and therefore did not "use"
it in competition with Dresser-Rand. Here, the court noted that no pub-
lished cases interpret "the term 'use' as that term is applied in the Texas
common law definition of misappropriation."' 1 The court analogized,
104. Id. at *13 (quoting U.S. Sporting Prods., Inc. v. Johnny Stewart Game Calls, Inc.,
865 S.W.2d 214, 218 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied)).
105. Id. at *14. Compare with other common law misappropriation cases in which
ideas-accompanied by detailed business plans, movie scripts or treatments, toy designs
and the like-may be proper subjects of "misappropriation" treatment. See Nat'l Basket-
ball Assn. v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853-54 (2d Cir. 1997); Reeves v. Alyeska Pipe-
line, 926 P.2d 1130, 1135-36 (Alaska 1996).
106. 361 F.3d 831, 839-40 (5th Cir. 2004).
107. Id. at 838.
108. Id. at 839 (quoting Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 778 (5th
Cir. 1999)).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 839-40.
111. Id. at 840.
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however, to the tort of misappropriation of trade secrets, explaining that
under Texas law, a defendant's attempt to market a product would satisfy
the commercial use requirement. 112 Here, it was clear that the former
employee and Apix were already taking orders for sales of the "clone"
product while Mr. Mezzatesta was still employed by Dresser-Rand; this
was enough for the court to conclude that Apix "did in fact 'use' the Trax
technology. '113
Apix also argued that it merely "planned to combine its own hardware
with publicly available software." But the court noted that the evidence
showed "Dresser-Rand, not Apix, was responsible for coming up with the
idea for the control system, investing the time, labor, skill, and money to
design the specifications, modify the existing hardware and software com-
ponents, and conduct the alpha testing of the product."1 14 Although the
court used the word "idea" here, there appeared to be more than a mere
"idea" at issue. 115
A federal district court in Houston helped clarify this area of law in
Keane v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.116 Plaintiff Keane alleged a variety
of claims against Fox TV, generally asserting that it copied his idea for a
talent show to be called "American Idol." He claimed that a mass mail-
ing of his "descriptive sales packet," internet postings, and discussions
with five individuals were facts showing that he had used his "American
Idol" marketing idea "in interstate commerce before the Fox television
show 'American Idol' began airing in summer 2002." 117
Keane sued for "common law misappropriation of idea/trade secret."
The court observed that Keane pleaded his misappropriation cause of ac-
tion in a confusing manner "because it combine[d] features and relie[d]
on case law involving three distinct causes of action: misappropriation of
a product, misappropriation of a trade secret, and misappropriation of an
idea."11 8 The court noted that misappropriation of a product or trade
secret "ha[s] been explicitly recognized under Texas law" but "misappro-
priation of an idea" has not.119 Nevertheless, the court assumed, appar-
ently without deciding, that all three causes of action are available under
Texas law and discussed each in turn.120
In analyzing "misappropriation of a product, the court cited Johnny
Stewart Game Calls.121 In analyzing misappropriation of a trade secret,
112. Id. (citing Forscan Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 389, 395 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied)).
113. Id.
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Cf Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1205 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a purchaser of a furnace was on notice that the furnace contained disputed
trade secrets, but escaped, or perhaps deferred, liability because it had not yet turned the
furnace on and hence had not "used" the trade secrets).
116. 297 F. Supp. 2d 921 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
117. Id. at 928-29.
118. Id. at 938.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 865 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied).
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the court quoted the familiar six-factor test repeated in In re Bass.'
2 2 To
elucidate "misappropriation of an idea," the court looked to Official Air-
lines Schedule Information Services, Inc. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. ("Oa-
sis"), 123 in which the Fifth Circuit defined the elements of
misappropriation of an idea as: "(1) the idea must be novel; (2) the disclo-
sure of the idea must be made in confidence; and (3) the idea must be
adopted and made use of by the defendant. ' 12 4 The court did note that
the law described in Oasis is not Texas law, but assuming it is applicable,
the court concluded that the pivotal element for purposes of a 12(b)(6)
motion would be the confidentiality element because the other two ele-
ments would be fact specific for the jury1 25
The court recognized that Keane did "not allege that he produced a
'product' as courts considering the viability of the misappropriation of a
product tort have construed that term," thus distinguishing this kind of
alleged misappropriation from the kind in Johnny Stewart Game Calls
and similar cases. 126 Instead, the court concluded it need only consider
whether Keane could sustain a cause of action for misappropriation of an
idea or a trade secret. In either case, a critical threshold issue would be
confidentiality.127 Keane could not meet this requirement. Though the
court would ordinarily presume the truth of his assertions in a 12(b)(6)
context, it was not required to accept as truth "conclusory allegations that
are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint," and one
court found this to be the case.1 28 Under Fifth Circuit precedent, Keane
could not "create a confidential relationship between himself and the
production companies to whom he allegedly sent his idea simply by de-
claring that it was self-evident that he hoped to be paid for [the materi-
als'] use.' 29 Also, sending ideas as he did-particularly by advertising
them on the internet-"entirely eviscerate[d] his ability to characterize
that concept as a trade secret or as an idea that was conveyed in confi-
dence to a select group.'
30
VI. COMMON LAW FRAUD
In Dresser-Rand v. Virtual Automation,1 31 Apix contended that al-
though it had signed two separate contracts with two different entities on
the same day, it could not be liable for common law fraud because its
contract with Virtual Automation expressly prohibited it from selling the
hardware in Dresser-Rand's "[a]rea of [a]pplication.' 32 The court
122. 113 S.W.3d 735, 739-40 (Tex. 2003).
123. 333 F.2d 672, 673-74 (5th Cir. 1964).
124. Id.
125. Keane, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 939.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 940.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 940-41.
131. 361 F.3d 831 (5th Cir. 2004).
132. Id. at 841.
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viewed the two contracts as irreconcilable. The contract with Virtual
Automation only prohibited Virtual Automation from selling to Dresser-
Rand and its subsidiaries or affiliates in the affected area; the contract did
not prohibit Virtual Automation from selling to anyone else. Accord-
ingly, it appeared that Virtual Automation would have the right to com-
pete with Dresser-Rand in that area, which would conflict with the
exclusive right Apix granted to Dresser-Rand on the same day. The
court, therefore, held this was sufficient to support the district court's de-
nial of Apix's motion for j.n.o.v. on Dresser-Rand's fraud claim.133
Another issue dealt with the damages Dresser-Rand could claim as a
result of this fraud, since Virtual Automation had never made a product
to compete with Dresser-Rand's product. In Apix's view, because Virtual
Automation never made a product, Dresser-Rand never suffered any
damages. 134 The court agreed that among the essential elements of fraud
is a showing of injury suffered as a result, and that the measure of dam-
ages in a fraud case is the actual amount of the plaintiff's loss that directly
or proximately results from the defendant's fraudulent conduct. 135 Point-
edly, the court noted that "[t]he desired end is actual compensation for
the injury, not lost profits. ' 136
Here, the loss suffered was Dresser-Rand's investment in the Trax
product. Dresser-Rand realized that it would be preempted by the other
fraudulently acquired product, which would "effectively cause Dresser-
Rand to lose its profitability.. . ." Accordingly, Dresser-Rand abandoned
the Trax product. The court held that this supported the jury's conclusion
that the fraud caused Dresser-Rand to prematurely withdraw from the
market, "thereby suffering the loss of its investment cost."'1 37
VII. NONCOMPETITION COVENANTS
The enforceability of stock option "clawbacks" was again an issue in
Olander v. Compass Bank.138 Olander was an at-will executive with
Compass Bank, subject to nondisclosure and noncompetition covenants.
Part of his compensation was stock options granted on an annual basis
through a series of annual agreements. The agreements, however, con-
tained what the court described as a "remarkable provision"-the en-
forceability of the noncompetition covenants was "a precondition for the
stock option to remain in effect."'1 39 If a court held the noncompetition
covenant to be invalid, Olander would have to return either the shares of
stock or the profits he had made from the stock's sale.' 40 Olander de-
133. Id.
134. Id. at 843-44.
135. Id. at 843 (citing Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 680 (Tex. 1996)).
136. Id. (citing C&C Partners v. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., 783 S.W.2d 707, 718(Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied)).
137. Id. at 844.
138. 363 F.3d 560, 562-63 (5th Cir. 2004).
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 563.
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scribed this as a "clawback provision," while Compass preferred to call it
a "restoration provision."'141 Olander exercised the stock options but left
Compass in 2001 and began working for a competitor. On summary judg-
ment, the district court held the noncompetition covenants unenforce-
able, but also held that Olander must pay to Compass the profits he made
from selling the stock received under two of the stock option
agreements. 142
The appellate court affirmed the judgment and refused to enforce the
noncompetition covenants. 143 Here the court found no non-illusory
promises: Olander was an at-will employee; the stock option contained
only illusory promises on Compass's part apparently because its obliga-
tions were dependent on a period of continued employment; the nondis-
closure agreement did not contain any express promises on Compass's
part to provide any trade secrets to Olander, nothing in the record sug-
gested that Compass actually provided any trade secrets to Olander, and
the district court "did not mention whether Compass proved that
Olander actually received any information" as opposed to merely having
access to it.144 Thus, Compass "failed to show that it accepted a unilat-
eral agreement," and the agreement did not constitute an "otherwise en-
forceable agreement . . . because it was not valid at the time of the
promise. '145
Interestingly, Compass also urged that the court's recent decision in
Guy Carpenter & Co. v. Provenza146 would require the court to find an
"otherwise enforceable agreement" in the stock option agreements them-
selves. However, the court distinguished Guy Carpenter on two grounds.
First, the parties had agreed to a severance package in event of improper
termination, which was a separate and enforceable agreement not present
in Olander. Second, the employer in Guy Carpenter expressly "promised
to provide confidential information to the employee," while the employer
in Olander made no such promise. 147
Olander's victory on noncompetition covenant may have been a phyr-
ric one; with a different interpretation of "supercede" in the later stock
option agreements, the appellate court required that he return not only
the profits from stock sales off the last option agreements, but the profits
from all of them.148
141. Id. at 562 n.5.
142. Id. at 563-64.
143. Id. at 564 (citing Light v. Centel Cellular Co., 883 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1994) (inter-
preting TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon 2004)).
144. Id. at 565 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 565-66.
146. 334 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2003).
147. Olander, 363 F.3d at 566 n.15.
148. Id. at 568.
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VIII. COMMON LAW UNFAIR COMPETITION
Under Texas law, "unfair competition" is a general rubric covering "all
statutory and nonstatutory causes of action arising out of business con-
duct which is contrary to honest practice in industrial or commercial mat-
ters. '' 149 "To prevail, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
committed an illegal act that interfered with the plaintiff's ability to con-
duct its business; the illegal act need not necessarily violate criminal law,
but must at least be an independent tort. '150
Applied to the Keane v. Fox Television Station's facts, the "indepen-
dently tortious act" alleged by Keane was that the defendants misappro-
priated his novel idea, which he claimed was a trade secret. Since his
misappropriation claims failed, however, his unfair competition claim
failed as well for a lack of underpinning.1 5 1
149. Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 14 (5th Cir. 1974).
150. Keane v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 921, 938 (S.D. Tex. 2004)
(citing Taylor Publ'g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 486 (5th Cir. 2000)).
151. See id. at 941.
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